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FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
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STANDARD ROOFING, INC.; ARZEE ROOFING SUPPLY 
CORP.; GAF CORPORATION; ALLIED ROOFING, INC.; 
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WHOLESALERS, INC.; WILLIAM HIGGINSON; 
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Before: BECKER, ROTH, Circuit Judges and 
DIAMOND, District Judge.* 
 
(Filed September 9, 1998) 
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* Honorable Gustave Diamond, United States District Judge for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
 
 
 
 
  
Finally, another former employee at Standard, Michael 
Hydro, testified that GAF comprised eighty percent of his 
sales while he worked there and at least five of Standard's 
customers purchased exclusively GAF product. He also 
explained that in 1989 and 1990, a large number of 
townhouse projects were already "spec'd" with GAF 
product, which made it impossible for the roofers to switch 
product lines mid-stream. Thus, anyone who could not 
supply GAF product was effectively barred from bidding for 
these jobs. On the basis of all of this evidence, we believe 
that Rossi has demonstrated that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists as to whether GAF product was special, 
and necessary for a distributor like Rossi to successfully 
compete in northern New Jersey. 
 
Against this background on the roofing market in general 
and GAF 's place in the market in particular, we move to 
the evidence Rossi adduced that GAF used secret rebates 
with several of its biggest distributors in northern New 
Jersey, including Standard, Arzee, and Allied, for that is 
critical to understanding the motivations of Rossi's 
horizontal competitors. Pursuant to this scheme, GAF 
provided these distributors off-invoice, non-volume 
discounts on their purchases. These "rebates," assuming 
they were only offered to a few favored distributors as Rossi 
contends, allowed those distributors to sell GAF product at 
or below the prevailing market price (as set by the 
distributors who did not receive the discounts) while 
secretly conspiring to pocket the difference. In GAF district 
sales manager Bud Krusa's words, "the less [sic] people 
[who] knew about it [the discounts], the less chance you 
[the smaller distributors] have of getting it[and] dropping 
the entire market price." The most favorable inference we 
can draw for Rossi from Krusa's statement is that if these 
highly secret rebates became widely known, the smaller 
distributors who were not receiving rebates would have put 
pressure on GAF to receive equal treatment, and that this 
shakeup of the market could ultimately destabilize prices, 
lead to a price war, and "drop[ ] the entire market price" for 
GAF product. 
 
By adducing evidence of the GAF rebate scheme and the 
importance of GAF and GAF product, Rossi transforms 
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what might otherwise have been a very difficult (and 
implausible) conspiracy into a realistic opportunity for a few 
cooperating competitors to fix prices and earn substantial 
profits while still operating within what appears to be a 
competitive marketplace. Cf. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 239 (1993) 
(holding that a conspiracy to fix supra-competitive prices in 
a market with many variables was implausible because of 
the complexity required to monitor and enforce it) (citations 
omitted). 
 
We find this case, as it relates to GAF, Standard, and 
Arzee, fundamentally unlike Matsushita. There, the critical 
problem with the conspiracy as alleged was that the 
conspirators had been losing large sums of money over a 
period of twenty plus years by undercutting the market in 
the hope of building market share and eventually 
establishing a monopoly. Not only did the Courtfind it 
difficult to distinguish the allegedly predatory pricing 
strategy from actual price competition, but given the 
extremely low chance that the scheme would succeed, the 
Court concluded that the defendants, if they operated in a 
rational manner, had no motive to engage in the conduct 
with which they were charged. In contrast, it is not difficult 
to divine the likely motive of the three distributors, 
Standard, Arzee, and Allied, in boycotting Rossi. As Rossi's 
horizontal competitors, they wanted to rid the market of a 
price-cutting competitor with a reputation for excellent 
service and reliability who had refused to cooperate in their 
price-fixing schemes in the past. Moreover, Rossi is aided in 
asking us to permit the fact finder to draw this inference by 
the strong likelihood that the boycott would actually 
succeed (as evidenced by the results). 
 
Even if all of this is true, submits GAF, it still does not 
explain why it would make sense for GAF to join the 
conspiracy. We agree that GAF 's motive, as the 
manufacturer-supplier, is less obvious than Standard's or 
Arzee's, but ultimately we find it no less compelling. This is 
because Rossi has adduced evidence that Standard, Arzee, 
and Allied possessed substantial economic leverage over 
GAF. Together, they purchased $10.7 million of the $24.1 
million of GAF product sold in New Jersey in 1989, or 
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44.5% of GAF 's total northern New Jersey sales. These 
distributors were not happy about the prospects of Rossi 
entering the market and competing with them, and they 
made their views known to GAF. Complaints and threats 
from three of GAF's largest customers in New Jersey are 
sufficient to establish a rational motive for GAF to engage 
in the concerted conduct that Rossi alleges. For these 
reasons, we do not accept GAF's submission that Rossi's 
conspiracy theory, and the economic motivations behind it, 
are inherently implausible. 
 
        (2) Circumstantial Evidence Against GAF  
 
We turn next to the circumstantial evidence that 
supports Rossi's allegations that GAF joined with Standard 
and Arzee (and potentially others) to enforce a market-wide 
boycott of first Rossi Florence and later Rossi Roofing, The 
evidence comes in several forms. First, as we will detail, 
Rossi has adduced evidence that GAF received numerous 
complaints about Rossi's pricing practices while he was at 
Standard and responded to them by asking Rossi to raise 
his resale prices on GAF product. While these complaints 
antedate Rossi entering the marketplace, they are useful 
background information to establish motive and practice. 
See Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1360-61. 
 
Second, GAF participated in the group boycott against 
Rossi through monitoring and enforcement activities and 
the implementation of an unprecedented anti-trans- 
shipment policy. Third, there is evidence that GAF singled 
out Rossi and acted contrary to its own corporate policy in 
refusing to deal with him (an important factor under 
Monsanto and Matsushita), in that GAF employees testified 
that the company had an "open distribution" policy under 
which they sold to all comers, yet GAF refused to sell to 
Rossi and went to considerable lengths to see that he was 
not able to secure GAF product from other sources. Finally, 
Rossi has also adduced evidence that two of GAF 's 
explanations why it refused to deal with him -- that it had 
adequate distribution in New Jersey and product shortage 
-- were pretextual. 
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         (a) Distributors' Complaints and GAF's Response 
 
While Rossi worked at Standard, the company received, 
as did Arzee and Allied, the off-invoice, non-volume rebates 
discussed supra. Rossi used these rebates to reduce the 
prices he charged to his customers in an effort to increase 
sales volume; he did not, as his competitors did, retain the 
rebates to increase gross profits. This aggressive price- 
cutting strategy understandably angered Standard's 
competitors, and several of them complained to GAF about 
Rossi's behavior. Krusa and Licciardello, both then working 
as GAF district sales managers in the New Jersey region, 
frequently called Rossi at Standard and passed along the 
complaints of Arzee, Allied, Passaic Metals and others 
about Rossi's pricing. Krusa and Licciardello also called 
Bob Schaab, the Controller of Standard, to complain that 
Rossi was passing on the discounts given by GAF to 
Standard to his customers. 
 
Although GAF did not have suggested resale prices, 
Krusa and Licciardello told Rossi to raise his resale prices 
for GAF product. Schaab, relaying GAF's messages, also 
asked Rossi to refrain from passing the GAF rebates to 
Standard's customers. Rossi refused, and vowed to price as 
he saw fit. This evidence suggests several things. First, it 
reaffirms the motives of Rossi's horizontal competitors, 
Arzee and to a lesser extent Standard. Second, it shows 
that a group of distributors (even a group that did not 
include Standard) could wield economic leverage over GAF 
and influence its interactions with recalcitrant distributors. 
Third, it suggests that GAF's course of conduct was to 
curry favor with its larger distributors by doing what it 
could to assist them in stabilizing the market and keeping 
price levels up. 
 
We agree with GAF that evidence that it succumbed to 
pressure from distributors is not sufficient, by itself, to 
survive summary judgment, since the evidence of 
complaints and threats GAF received from Standard and 
Arzee is not enough in isolation to prove concerted action. 
See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64 ("[p]ermitting an 
agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of 
complaints, or even from the fact that termination came 
about `in response to' complaints, could deter or penalize 
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perfectly legitimate conduct."); Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 111. 
However, we do not rely solely on these complaints. Rather, 
there is a substantial amount of additional evidence to 
support a finding of an unlawful conspiracy. In this 
circumstance, we are permitted to consider the evidence of 
distributor complaints. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 n.8 
("We do not suggest that evidence of complaints has no 
probative value at all, but only that the burden remains on 
the antitrust plaintiff to introduce additional evidence 
sufficient to support a finding of an unlawful contract, 
combination, or conspiracy."). 
 
         (b) Actions in Contravention of GAF Corporate 
       Policy 
 
GAF's boycott against Rossi appears to be contrary to its 
own corporate policy, particularly in light of the evidence 
adduced of GAF's draconian enforcement and anti-trans- 
shipment activities. There is testimony in the record that 
GAF had an open distribution system. Peter Bacchione, 
GAF 's director of marketing and sales and Krusa's superior 
in 1989, testified that GAF never had a closed distribution 
network and never rejected a potential distributor because 
the local market was saturated. Bacchione testified: 
 
       Q: Do you recall in 1989 whether GAF, with respect  to 
       the roofing products that you had responsibility for, 
       had any particular objectives with respect to 
       increasing, decreasing, or otherwise, its distribution 
       channel. 
 
       A: . . . We always looked to increase our share of 
       business with any distributor. 
 
       Q: Did GAF have any exclusive distributors for roofing 
       products while you were national sales director? 
 
       A: No. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Q: Wasn't GAF's philosophy to have an open 
       distribution network? 
 
       * * * 
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       A: Maybe it was -- maybe it was a philosophy. A 
       practice. Whether it was a philosophy that was up on 
       a wall some place, I don't recall that. 
 
       Q: Was it the practice? 
 
       A: Generally, we sold on an open basis. There were  no 
       exclusivities.14 
 
This testimony directly contradicts GAF's litigation 
position as stated by Krusa, who has maintained since 
1989 that GAF refused to supply Rossi because it had 
"adequate distribution."15 Krusa is also contradicted by 
Lorraine Campbell, Ruth Rogers, Mary Lou Sperr and Bob 
Tafaro, all of whom worked for Krusa, and all of whom 
testified that Krusa never told them that GAF had adequate 
distribution in New Jersey. Finally, Rossi submits that 
Krusa is contradicted by the fact that GAF supplied 34 out 
of the 39 distributors in northern New Jersey, and only 
refused to sell to three distributors including Rossi Roofing. 
On summary judgment, of course, we need not resolve this 
dispute, but rather grant Rossi all favorable inferences. 
 
         (c) Monitoring and Enforcement Activities 
 
GAF, through Krusa and Licciardello, took still more 
steps to ensure that Rossi did not get any GAF product. In 
January 1989, when Droesch told Krusa that he planned to 
buy GAF product through his Florence Corporation in Long 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Bacchione appears to contradict himself during his deposition. For 
example, in reference to the decision whether to open up ABC as a 
distributor after Rossi Roofing had gone out of business, Bacchione also 
said: "The concern was not whether or not to open up another 
distributor. The concern was whether or not we had adequate 
distribution, I think was the subject at hand. I think we felt there was 
adequate distribution. . . . There was not a valid reason to open up 
another distributor [next door to Standard]." This contradictory 
testimony leads to two possible conclusions, and on summary judgment, 
we must accept the one most favorable to Rossi. 
 
15. For example, Krusa allegedly told Droesch in January 1989 that GAF 
would not sell to Rossi Florence in New Jersey because it had adequate 
distribution. In July 1989, when Krusa prevented Rossi from picking up 
an order of GAF product from HWI, Rossi spoke with Krusa who told 
him, "The distribution is filled. GAF requires no other distributors." 
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Island and resell it to Rossi Florence, Krusa told Droesch 
that "he would not allow that and he would not sell me [sic] 
in Long Island if I did that." GAF also warned other 
distributors not to resell its products to Rossi, and there is 
evidence that, on at least one occasion, GAF took steps to 
enforce its boycott. GAF salesmen Sal Granfort and Doug 
Collins warned DiNaso & Sons, a roofing and siding 
distributor located in Staten Island, New York, not to resell 
its product to Rossi. After DiNaso & Sons ignored their 
warnings, GAF raised DiNaso's prices by $1.00/unit, 
arguably in retaliation. Similarly, when Rossi contacted 
Stroeber Supply, another northern New Jersey distributor, 
to see if it would sell GAF product to him, Larry 
Hammershock of Stroeber told a Rossi Roofing employee 
that Stroeber had already been told by GAF not to sell GAF 
product to Rossi Roofing. Hammershock defied GAF and 
sold to Rossi Roofing anyway, but at a higher price. 
 
There is also evidence that GAF extended the boycott to 
buying groups like HWI and Servistar which Rossi began to 
use, in addition to distributors like Stroeber and DiNaso, to 
try to circumvent the GAF boycott.16 To this end, Rossi 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Rossi contests the district court's affirmance of an order by the 
magistrate judge, denying his motion to compel GAF to disclose the 
names of the entity or entities that were the subject matter of certain 
conversations between GAF 's in-house counsel Robert Poyourow and 
Krusa on July 27, 1989, August 10, 1989, and January 6, 1990. Rossi 
hypothesizes that several of these discussions centered around HWI and 
Servistar, and he submits that the district court abused its discretion 
when it accepted GAF's description of the "subject matter" of these 
conversations on its privilege log as "absence of a legal obligation to 
sell 
product." We conclude, however, that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Rossi's motion to compel the name of the entity 
discussed or any other additional information concerning the "subject 
matter" of the conversation catalogued in GAF's privilege log. See 
Rabushka v. United States, 122 F.3d 559, 565 (8th Cir. 1997) (standard 
of review), cert. denied, Rabushka ex rel. United States v. Crane Co., 118 
S. Ct. 1336 (1998). Rule 26(b)(5) only requires that a party claiming a 
privilege "describe the nature of the documents, communications, or 
things not produced or disclosed in a manner that . . . will enable other 
parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection." Fed. 
R. 
Civ. Pro. 26(b)(5). These matters are generally best left to the district 
and 
magistrate courts' discretion. In the circumstances that exist here, we 
will not second guess the courts' conclusion that the description 
provided was adequate to support the privilege claim. 
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joined HWI in July 1989 and placed an order for GAF 
product. Membership in HWI ordinarily should have 
allowed Rossi to purchase products from all of HWI's 
suppliers, including GAF. Likewise, GAF normally supplied 
its products to all HWI members, regardless of whether 
they appeared on GAF's own customer list. 
Notwithstanding this, when a Rossi Roofing driver went to 
GAF's facility on July 27, 1989, to pick up the GAF 
product ordered through HWI, GAF would not release it. 
After several hours of wrangling over the order, Rossi 
eventually spoke with Krusa, who had given the order not 
to release the GAF product. Krusa told Rossi "I am not 
selling to you. The distribution is filled. GAF requires no 
other distributors." Rossi replied that GAF was not really 
selling to Rossi Roofing, but rather to HWI, to which Krusa 
responded, "We are not selling to you." After this dramatic 
exchange, Dave Heine of HWI remarked that he had never 
seen anything like this in his ten years working at the 
buying group. App. at 2596, 3513. 
 
In yet another effort to obtain GAF product and 
circumvent the boycott, Rossi used Far Hills Lumber and 
Hardware ("Far Hills"), a start-up hardware store of which 
he was a principal, to place orders through the buying 
group Servistar. See supra S II.B.2.a and infra S II.B.2.c. 
Rossi was able to purchase one order of $30,000 worth of 
GAF product on August 2 and 3, 1989. However, after GAF 
and Standard found out that Rossi had used Far Hills and 
Servistar to get GAF product, see infra S II.B.2.c, GAF 
refused to fill Far Hills' second order for $456 of GAF 
product. 
 
Rossi has also adduced evidence that GAF and Standard 
coordinated to ensure that Rossi was not getting any GAF 
product. See supra S II.B.2.a. Rossi developed evidence that 
Licciardello of Standard confirmed with Gessner of GAF 
that GAF was not selling to Rossi, and there is evidence 
that, after seeing GAF product in front of Rossi Roofing, 
Licciardello called and was reassured by GAF that the load 
was not for Rossi but bound for Walmart on a Jentar truck. 
See id. In addition, there is the statement made by 
Licciardello after he learned that Rossi Roofing had been 
getting GAF product through Far Hills and Servistar that 
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" `that's the last time we're going to be seeing any GAF 
across the street.' They got the -- they were getting the 
loads through [Far Hills], which is [Servistar]. That's how 
Joe Rossi was getting GAF and he's [Licciardello] going to 
put an end to that. `Never going to see another GAF load 
across the street.' " See supra S II.B.2.a. 
 
         (d) Pretextual Excuses 
 
Finally, Rossi argues that GAF used pretextual excuses to 
explain why it refused to supply Rossi, and that this use of 
pretext is further circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy 
he alleges. See Fragale, 760 F.2d at 474 (pretextual excuses 
are circumstantial evidence that can disprove the likelihood 
of independent action). The first excuse is that Rossi was 
not needed because GAF had adequate distribution. Rossi 
notes that, despite Krusa's contention that everyone in his 
office knew that he had "adequate distribution" in New 
Jersey, neither his boss, Peter Bacchione, nor his 
employees, Lorraine Campbell, Ruth Rogers, Mary Lou 
Sperr, and Bob Tafaro had ever heard of this policy. Even 
Krusa admits that GAF had never refused to fill an order 
through a buying group like Servistar because its 
distribution was allegedly full. 
 
This "adequate distribution" excuse is just the "flip side" 
of Rossi's contention that GAF was acting in contravention 
of its open distribution policy, and for the same reasons 
that there is a genuine issue whether GAF 's policy was to 
supply all distributors who wished to purchase its 
products, there is also a genuine issue of material fact 
whether the "adequate distribution" justification Krusa gave 
to Rossi was legitimate or simply pretextual. We note again 
that GAF supplied its roofing product to at least 34 of the 
39 distributors in the northern New Jersey marketplace, 
but not to Rossi. 
 
GAF's second excuse, which Rossi submits was also 
pretextual, was that GAF had a product shortage and 
therefore could not supply any new distributors. Rossi 
contends that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 
the validity of this excuse because Bacchione, GAF's 
national sales manager, testified that he could recall no 
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problems in filling customer orders for GAF product in 
1989, despite the fact that this would have been a matter 
within his job responsibilities. In addition, Rossi argues 
that the only document GAF has been able to produce to 
corroborate Krusa's claim that GAF product was in short 
supply in 1988 and 1989 was a memorandum dated 
August 11, 1989. Rossi submits that this memorandum 
should not be considered conclusive for the purposes of 
summary judgment because it was written almost nine 
months after GAF had decided not to supply Rossi 
Florence. GAF counters that the memorandum refers to the 
product shortage as a "continuing" issue, and therefore that 
summary judgment is appropriate. 
 
The critical language in the memorandum is: 
 
       We continue to have an im-balance of inventory 
       between Baltimore and So. Bound Brook. The lack of 
       warehousing has been a very critical issue, causing the 
       im-balance in inventory. 
 
       We are receiving more calls, on a daily basis, from 
       customers in the southern half of the district 
       complaining of our lack of product and the congestion 
       of trucks and also the length of time it takes to get 
       loaded at the Baltimore Plant. 
 
Our reading of the document is that it is ambiguous and 
therefore insufficient to command summary judgment. For 
example, it is unclear whether the memorandum refers to 
an overall GAF product shortage or just a warehousing "im- 
balance" that was temporarily interfering with delivery to 
the southern half of Krusa's territory. Also, while the 
memorandum refers to the problem as a "continuing" one, 
there is no indication what that means. On summary 
judgment, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 
Rossi, he has established a genuine issue of fact whether 
both the "adequate distribution" and the "product shortage" 
excuses were pretextual. 
 
         (e) Conclusion 
 
To summarize, we find that Rossi has adduced competent 
evidence that GAF: (1) responded to distributor complaints 
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in the past; (2) singled out Rossi as one of the few 
distributors out of a large number in northern New Jersey 
not to receive GAF product; (3) acted in contravention of its 
own established open distribution policy in dealing with 
Rossi; (4) threatened and punished distributors who resold 
to Rossi; (5) refused to supply Rossi through buying groups; 
(6) implemented an unprecedented policy prohibiting trans- 
shipment of GAF product to Rossi; (7) cooperated with 
Standard in monitoring and enforcing the boycott; and (8) 
offered pretextual excuses to explain its behavior. 
Examining the totality of this evidence, it is sufficient to 
support a reasonable inference that GAF was acting in 
concert with Standard and Arzee to boycott Rossi. 
 
Particularly forceful is the evidence that GAF prohibited 
distributors from trans-shipping GAF product to Rossi and 
that GAF prevented Rossi from purchasing its products 
from buying groups. These actions simply do not make 
sense in light of GAF's asserted justifications for its 
behavior vis a vis Rossi. For example, if there were truly a 
product shortage in northern New Jersey, presumably GAF 
would then have cut off supply to all Servistar and HWI 
members who were not on GAF's approved customer list to 
ensure that its larger distributors like Standard and Arzee 
would not suffer from the short supply. Yet, GAF supplied 
Far Hills, also an entity that was not on GAF's customer 
list, until it discovered that Far Hills was under Rossi's 
control. Moreover, the product shortage excuse is not 
consistent with GAF's claim that it unilaterally 
implemented a policy precluding trans-shipment of product 
at the distributor level. Assuming that GAF product was 
scarce, GAF would understandably want to ensure that its 
favored distributors received it ahead of all others. However, 
once GAF decided how it would allocate among its approved 
distributors whatever amount of GAF product existed, it is 
difficult to conceive of a legitimate reason why GAF would 
care whether that distributor used the product or resold it 
to Rossi Roofing at a profit. 
 
Additionally, the product shortage justification does not 
explain why GAF would sell Droesch as much GAF product 
as he wanted in Long Island but would not allow him to 
trans-ship that product to New Jersey. Similarly, it is hard 
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to comprehend why GAF would continue to fill $30,000 
orders, obviously commercial-sized purchases, to buying 
group members in northern New Jersey, if it was truly 
believed that it had adequate distribution in that market. 
One explanation of this behavior is that GAF was acting in 
concert with Standard, Arzee, and Allied to boycott Rossi 
and force him out of business. 
 
For the reasons described above, Rossi has met his 
burden of adducing evidence that tends to exclude the 
possibility of independent action, and hence we will reverse 
the district court's order granting summary judgment in 
favor of GAF. 
 
       c. Servistar 
 
In contrast to the defendants discussed above, we will 
affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Servistar because Rossi has failed to introduce 
either direct or circumstantial evidence that tends to 
exclude the possibility that Servistar acted independently 
rather than joining the conspiracy against Rossi. 
 
Servistar's involvement in this case stems from its refusal 
to honor Rossi's second purchase request for $456 of GAF 
product on August 11, 1989. Rossi had already obtained a 
little over $30,000 of GAF product on August 8 and 9, 
1989, via his Far Hills account with Servistar, which was 
resold to Rossi Roofing. Two days later, when Rossi 
attempted to order a second batch, Servistar did notfill it, 
claiming that GAF had cut Far Hills off from obtaining GAF 
product. Rossi contends that after he received thefirst 
order of GAF product, Standard and Arzee discovered how 
he had circumvented the blockade, notified GAF, and that 
GAF then enlisted Servistar to join the group boycott and 
cut off this new avenue of supply. Rossi offers three pieces 
of evidence to support this allegation: (1) a discussion he 
had with Jim Cherbonneau of Servistar in which 
Cherbonneau told him that GAF did not want Servistar to 
ship its product to Rossi and that GAF would not supply 
Rossi through his Servistar account;17  (2) Servistar's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Cherbonneau told Rossi, "GAF called, they knew where the product 
was going. They had filled their needs in that area, and [ ] they do not 
want us to ship to you." 
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curious and sudden change of mind, selling Rossi $30,000 
of GAF product one day and refusing a minuscule $456 
order two days later; and (3) Servistar's use of the allegedly 
pretextual excuse that Far Hills had credit problems to 
justify its refusal to deal. 
 
Rossi's only direct evidence, the phone conversation with 
Cherbonneau, is not evidence of Servistar's conspiratorial 
involvement. Cherbonneau said that "GAF would not sell 
product to Servistar to go to -- through [Far Hills] to me." 
Cherbonneau's statement, while not precluding concerted 
action, is evidence only of a unilateral decision by GAF to 
not supply Rossi through any means (or a multilateral 
conspiracy that did not include Servistar). Additionally, it is 
undisputed that Servistar could not force GAF to supply it 
or its members with GAF product. Unlike other products 
Servistar supplied, Servistar neither stored GAF product in 
its warehouses nor had the contractual right to compel GAF 
to supply the product. The Servistar-GAF purchasing 
agreement did not obligate GAF to accept all of Servistar's 
members' orders. 
 
Because Servistar provided GAF product to its members 
on what is known in the industry as a "drop shipment" 
basis, it had no control over whether its suppliers would 
actually deliver their products to its members. The"drop 
shipment" relationship between Servistar and GAF meant 
that when a Servistar member placed an order with 
Servistar for GAF product, Servistar would forward that 
order to GAF. The member would then go to the GAF 
warehouse to pick up the GAF product directly from GAF, 
not Servistar. GAF then would invoice Servistar for the 
purchase, and Servistar would pay GAF. Subsequently, 
Servistar would collect the amount due from its member. 
Using this "drop shipment" purchasing method, Servistar 
assists its members by: (1) negotiating group discounts 
from manufacturers, and (2) acting as the guarantor of its 
members' credit to those manufacturers. Thus, Servistar's 
role did not include pre-purchasing and warehousing of 
GAF product, and it had virtually no say over which of its 
members GAF chose to supply. 
 
Under these circumstances, Rossi's claim that "at the 
request of GAF, Servistar refused to fill Far Hills' next order 
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for $450 because Far Hills had resold it to Rossi Roofing," 
is not supported by Rossi's own testimony. As described 
above, according to the undisputed evidence, GAF did not 
have to conspire with Servistar to boycott Rossi Roofing 
because GAF did not need Servistar's acquiescence to 
prohibit Far Hills or Rossi Roofing from buying its product 
through Servistar. Since there is no evidence that Servistar 
could overrule a unilateral GAF decision to refuse to supply 
a Servistar member, we cannot reasonably infer on the 
basis of such ambiguous evidence that Servistar and GAF 
agreed to refuse to sell to Far Hills. See International 
Logistics Group Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904, 907 
(6th Cir. 1989) (no credible conspiracy is alleged where a 
manufacturer imposing distribution restraints does not 
need agreement or acquiescence from its distributors in 
formulating marketing conditions for its product); 6 Phillip 
E. Areeda, Antitrust Law P 1402b4 (1986) ("discussions, 
suggestions, recommendations, and the giving of 
information do not indicate any conspiracy where the actor 
imposing the alleged restraint does not wish or need the 
acquiescence of the other party or any quid pro quo from 
him"). 
 
Similarly, Rossi's allegation that Servistar made no effort 
to require GAF to fill the order of its member Far Hills does 
not support his theory of conspiracy. Without direct 
evidence (or other strong circumstantial evidence) of 
concerted action by Servistar and GAF, we cannot draw an 
inference of an unlawful conspiracy from the equivocal 
nature of Servistar's decision not to make what would most 
likely have been a futile effort to encourage GAF to sell to 
Rossi. Servistar's refusal to disrupt its relationship with 
GAF because GAF unilaterally (from Servistar's perspective) 
refused to deal with Rossi is clearly "as consistent with 
permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy," 
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588 (citations omitted), and is not 
evidence of a "conscious commitment to a common 
scheme." Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764. We note in this regard 
that there is no evidence that Servistar was on notice that 
GAF was part of a conspiracy to boycott Rossi Roofing. 
Thus, from Servistar's point of view, this was simply a 
unilateral refusal to deal. Indeed, even if Servistar did know 
that GAF was involved in an unlawful group boycott, its 
 
                                55 
  
decision to continue relations with GAF would still not rise 
to the level of concerted action. 
 
Without direct evidence with respect to Servistar, we 
must also consider whether Rossi's conspiracy theory is 
plausible, and whether inferring concerted action under 
these circumstances would have the effect of deterring 
significant procompetitive conduct. See Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d 
at 1233. Both of these considerations militate against 
inferring concerted action with respect to Servistar. Apart 
from the evidence discussed above that it would be 
unreasonable to infer that Servistar would conspire with 
GAF to do what GAF could do unilaterally (i.e. refuse to 
release GAF product to Rossi from GAF warehouses), it is 
similarly implausible that GAF, an extremely minor 
Servistar supplier, could "pressure" Servistar, a billion plus 
dollar buying cooperative, into joining the group boycott of 
Rossi Roofing, a small start-up roofing and siding 
distributor. Similarly, Rossi has adduced no evidence of a 
motive for Servistar to join the conspiracy. See Matsushita, 
475 U.S. at 596-97. Nothing in the record indicates that 
Servistar had any reason to support a conspiracy to 
increase or stabilize wholesale roofing prices in New Jersey, 
and, to repeat, there is simply no evidence of GAF leverage 
over Servistar.18 
 
Perhaps most importantly, inferring a conspiracy from 
the slim circumstantial evidence would have the effect of 
deterring Servistar's significant procompetitive conduct in 
this as well as many other markets. As a wholesale 
purchasing cooperative, Servistar bolsters competition and 
increases economic efficiency by aggregating small 
purchasers thereby permitting them "to achieve economies 
of scale in both the purchase and warehousing of wholesale 
supplies, and also ensur[ing] ready access to a stock of 
goods that might otherwise be unavailable on short notice. 
The cost savings and order-filling guarantees enable smaller 
retailers to reduce prices and maintain their retail stock so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Sales of GAF product through Servistar, estimated at about $2.5 
million, comprised only 12% of Servistar's total roofing purchases on 
behalf of its members and an insignificant fraction of Servistar's one 
billion plus national purchases in 1989. 
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as to compete more effectively with larger retailers." 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295. If we were 
to permit an antitrust violation to be inferred under the 
facts of this case, it would significantly impact the ability of 
Servistar to continue its procompetitive actions in the 
market. 
 
Because Servistar could not compel GAF to sell to Far 
Hills, Servistar's only option in response to GAF's decision 
not to supply Far Hills would have been to somehow bring 
pressure to bear on the roofing manufacturer. Such action 
would undoubtedly adversely affect all Servistar members 
nationwide who were receiving improved pricing for GAF 
product through Servistar, especially if it led to the 
restriction or cessation of Servistar's purchasing agreement 
with GAF. Indeed, inferring concerted action in these 
circumstances could encourage Servistar to terminate 
relationships with every supplier that refused to sell to a 
particular Servistar member. This would deter Servistar's 
procompetitive activities and deny Servistar's members the 
significant benefits of cooperative membership. 
 
Finally, Rossi submits that Servistar offered a pretextual 
excuse to explain its decision not to supply Far Hills with 
GAF product. Pretextual excuses, as noted, can disprove 
the likelihood of independent action. See Fragale, 760 F.2d 
at 474. Rossi challenges Servistar's explanation that it 
refused to supply the second order of GAF product to Far 
Hills because of Far Hills' credit problems. Although it 
appears that there are genuine issues of fact concerning 
Far Hills' credit-worthiness and its impact on Servistar's 
decision to refuse Rossi's second order of GAF product,19 
considering Servistar's lack of motive to conspire, GAF's 
lack of any leverage over Servistar, and the fact that GAF 
did not need to enlist Servistar's help to boycott Rossi, this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. On the one hand, the record indicates that Servistar refused Far Hills 
credit on August 15, 1989, even though Far Hills had only used $30,755 
of its outstanding $75,000 credit limit and no payments were yet due. 
On the other hand, Servistar contends that it extended the $75,000 
credit limit to Far Hills for the purpose of funding hardware purchases, 
not roofing supplies. According to Servistar's forceful rejoinder, the 
initial 
order of $30,755 was an error, and after it was discovered, Servistar 
unilaterally determined not to permit it to happen again. 
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slim reed of pretext is simply not enough. In view of the 
procompetitive role Servistar plays in the market generally 
and concerned that we do not "chill the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect," Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 594, we conclude that Rossi has not met his burden 
here in opposing summary judgment, and therefore we will 
affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment 
in favor of Servistar. 
 
       d. Wood Fiber 
 
Like GAF, Wood Fiber manufactures roofing products, 
including Structodek FS, which is widely used in certain 
commercial roofing applications. Unlike GAF, however, 
Wood Fiber is only tangentially involved in the alleged 
conspiracy with its activity centering around a single 
incident in which Rossi was frustrated in his attempt to 
purchase approximately $5,000 worth of Structodek FS. We 
will affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Wood Fiber because, as with Servistar, Rossi has 
failed to introduce evidence that tends to exclude the 
possibility that Wood Fiber acted independently rather than 
joining the conspiracy against Rossi. 
 
On June 6, 1989, Rossi Roofing ordered Structodek FS 
from Wood Fiber for its customer, Star Roofing. Wood Fiber 
quoted a price and a shipping date of July 5th to Rossi 
Roofing. On June 27, 1989, Karl Loser, Wood Fiber's sales 
representative in New Jersey, called and told Rossi 
Roofing's Mike Issler that Wood Fiber would notfill the 
order. As a result, Rossi Roofing lost the order for 
Structodek FS from Star Roofing. Rossi claims that Loser 
told him that Wood Fiber was being pressured by Standard 
and Arzee not to sell to him and that there was a"problem" 
with his pricing. Loser also told Issler that Wood Fiber had 
previously sold product to a small distributor on Long 
Island and suffered when Allied canceled orders in 
retaliation. Loser testified that he wanted to supply Rossi 
Roofing, but that his concerns that Rossi Roofing's 
competitors would retaliate "influenced" his decision not to 
supply Rossi Roofing. 
 
Based upon these facts, Rossi asks us to infer that Wood 
Fiber participated in a conspiracy to boycott Rossi Roofing 
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because it gave in to pressure and fear of retaliation by 
several of its distributors. It is well established that this 
kind of evidence, by itself, is legally insufficient to prove a 
conspiracy. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763-64; Sweeney, 
637 F.2d at 111. In Sweeney, the plaintiffs contended that 
"the retailers' acts of complaining and [the defendant's] 
reaction to the complaints constituted concerted action in 
restraint of trade." Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 110. We rejected 
that argument and noted that "even if the appellants had 
demonstrated that [the defendant's] actions were in 
response to these complaints, such evidence alone would 
not show the necessary concerted action." Id. Similarly, in 
Monsanto, the Supreme Court opined that "[p]ermitting an 
agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of 
complaints, or even from the fact that termination came 
about `in response to' complaints, could deter or penalize 
perfectly legitimate conduct." 465 U.S. at 763. Thus, the 
Court held that " `[t]o permit the inference of concerted 
action on the basis of receiving complaints alone and thus 
to expose the defendant to treble damage liability would 
both inhibit management's exercise of independent 
business judgment and emasculate the terms of the 
statute.' " Id. at 764 (quoting Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 111 
n.2). 
 
We have explained at length supra why the claims 
against Standard, Arzee, and GAF survive, notwithstanding 
these precedents. However, because Rossi has not adduced 
evidence of anything other than the fact that Wood Fiber 
may have responded to pressure and threats from Standard 
and Arzee, we cannot infer the existence of concerted action 
involving Wood Fiber. The evidence adduced against Wood 
Fiber stands in stark contrast to the evidence against GAF. 
For example, Rossi has not adduced any evidence that 
Wood Fiber offered pretextual excuses, or prohibited trans- 
shipment of its product, or engaged in monitoring and 
enforcement of the alleged boycott. Without some additional 
evidence, a fact finder may not infer that Wood Fiber 
entered into an agreement to boycott Rossi Florence or 
Rossi Roofing, and therefore we will affirm the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Wood 
Fiber. 
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III. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND ANTITRUST INJURY 
 
Having determined that Rossi has adduced sufficient 
evidence of a conspiracy to satisfy the first prong of the 
prima facie case with respect to the Standard defendants, 
the Arzee defendants, and GAF, we now consider whether 
Rossi has adduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the fourth 
prong, "that the plaintiffs were injured as a proximate 
result of that conspiracy." Tunis Bros., 763 F.2d at 1489.20 
 
The district court concluded that even if Rossi had 
established the existence of an agreement, his claim still 
would fail because he had not established that the business 
losses he suffered were in any way related to that 
conspiracy. See Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 958 F. 
Supp. 976, 991 (D.N.J. 1997). The court determined that 
Rossi's allegations -- that the defendants prevented him 
from obtaining GAF and other roofing products he needed 
to compete and thereby stopped him from opening Rossi 
Florence and ultimately forced Rossi Roofing out of 
business -- are unsupported in the record. The district 
court also concluded that Rossi's damages expert, Regan R. 
Rockhill, CPA, based his report upon unfounded 
assumptions that would force a trier of fact to use 
"guesswork and speculation" in determining what, if any, 
injury Rossi suffered as a result of the defendants' actions. 
See id. The court criticized the Rockhill Report for being 
nothing more than an impermissible "but for" damage 
model that erroneously ignored several important factors, 
including failing: (1) to consider that Rossi had no 
experience running his own business; (2) to analyze 
specifically what products were needed to assure a 
successful distributorship; and (3) to engage in any 
analysis of what harm, if any, was caused by the alleged 
antitrust violations as opposed to other factors, such as 
Rossi's management style or general business conditions. 
See id. 
 
The district court accordingly held that Rossi had not 
presented sufficient evidence of damages such that a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. As explained above, because Rossi's allegations qualify for per se 
treatment, the second and third prongs of the four-part antitrust prima 
facie case are conclusively presumed. See supra S II.A. 
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reasonable inference could be made connecting the injury 
with the defendants' conduct. For the reasons we will 
explain, we disagree with the court's conclusion that Rossi 
has not identified a genuine issue of material fact with 
regard to the proximate cause and damages element of his 
prima facie case. 
 
To recover damages, an antitrust plaintiff must prove 
causation, described in our jurisprudence as "fact of 
damage or injury." See Danny Kresky Enters. Corp. v. 
Magid, 716 F.2d 206, 209 (3d Cir. 1983). It is not necessary 
to show with total certainty the amount of damages 
sustained, just that the antitrust violation caused the 
antitrust injury suffered by the plaintiff. See Amerinet, Inc. 
v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1493 (8th Cir. 1992); Danny 
Kresky, 716 F.2d at 211 ("the standard of causation 
requires only that plaintiff prove that defendant's illegal 
conduct was a material cause of its injury"). As the 
Supreme Court explained in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9 (1968) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis in original): 
 
       [Plaintiff's] burden of proving the fact of damage under 
       S 4 of the Clayton Act is satisfied by its proof of some 
       damage flowing from the unlawful conspiracy; inquiry 
       beyond this minimum point goes only to the amount 
       and not the fact of damages. It is enough that the 
       illegality is shown to be a material cause of the injury; 
       a plaintiff need not exhaust all possible alternative 
       sources of injury in fulfilling his burden of proving 
       compensable injury under S 4. 
 
Once causation is established, the jury is permitted to 
calculate the actual damages suffered using a " `reasonable 
estimate, as long as the jury verdict is not the product of 
speculation or guess work.' " In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore 
Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1176 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing 
MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 
F.2d 1081, 1161 (7th Cir. 1983)) (other citations omitted). 
Thus, in antitrust cases, there are ultimately two related, 
but distinct, inquiries to establish antitrust injury. First, 
the plaintiff must prove the fact of antitrust injury, as part 
of his prima facie case; then, he must make a showing 
regarding the amount of damages, in order to justify an 
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award by the trier of fact. Concerning the former, courts 
apply the ordinary standard of proof, but with respect to 
the latter, the standard is somewhat relaxed. See In re 
Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore, 998 F.2d at 1176 ("[t]he relaxed 
measure of proof is afforded to the amount, not the 
causation of loss -- the nexus between the defendant's 
illegal activity and the injuries suffered must be reasonably 
proven.") (citations omitted); see also Bigelow v. RKO Radio 
Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946) (holding that when 
the plaintiff cannot prove his damages by precise 
computation, the jury "may make a just and reasonable 
estimate of the damage based on relevant data, and render 
its verdict accordingly"). 
 
Under these standards, Rossi's antitrust claim does not 
suffer from the infirmities claimed by the district court. At 
the threshold, it is important to note that we need only 
concern ourselves with the first element of antitrust injury, 
causation. At this procedural juncture, reviewing the 
district court's grant of the defendants' motions for 
summary judgment, we are not, as we would be upon 
reviewing a jury verdict, determining whether a plaintiff has 
brought forth sufficient evidence to justify the actual 
damages awarded. Rather, here, all we are concerned with 
is whether Rossi has established that the defendants' 
"illegal conduct was a material cause of [his] injury." Danny 
Kresky, 716 F.2d at 211; see also Zenith Radio, 395 U.S. at 
114 n.9. 
 
We find two sources of evidence sufficient for Rossi to 
demonstrate fact of injury or causation: (1) evidence of 
specific lost transactions based upon Rossi's inability to 
purchase product; and (2) the Rockhill Damage Report. We 
discuss these in turn. 
 
We have already explained that there is ample evidence 
in the record that Standard, Arzee, and GAF conspired to 
deny Rossi access to GAF product and prevent him from 
competing in the roofing and siding business in northern 
New Jersey. See supra S II.B.2.a & b. Also, there is evidence 
that, with a few exceptions, the defendants successfully 
prevented Rossi from obtaining GAF product. See id. 
Moreover, there is evidence that GAF product was highly 
desirable, if not critical, to Rossi's target customers. See 
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supra S II.B.2.b(1). Finally, several of Rossi's former 
customers from his Standard days, including Sean Coffey, 
Francis Doherty, John Feher, Albert Logan, and Melvin 
Stanley, have testified that they would have done business 
with Rossi Roofing if he had had access to the necessary 
products, primarily GAF product. 
 
This evidence is enough by itself to satisfy Rossi's burden 
on causation for the purposes of summary judgment. Rossi 
has put forth evidence that the defendants' alleged 
conspiracy unlawfully prevented him from obtaining GAF 
product, and that he lost multiple sales as a result. Thus, 
if Rossi can successfully prove the existence of the 
conspiracy, he will have proved fact of injury. The case 
before us is not analogous to Van Dyk Research Corp. v. 
Xerox Corp., 478 F. Supp. 1268 (D.N.J. 1979), a case upon 
which the district court relied, where the plaintiff failed to 
prove fact of injury primarily because it could not show that 
it lost even a single contract based upon the alleged 
unlawful practices of the defendant. See 478 F. Supp. at 
1327. 
 
In the same vein, Amerinet is not availing to the 
defendants either. In Amerinet, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the plaintiff had not shown antitrust injury 
or causation in large part because statements and 
assertions by its own damage expert "strongly suggest[ed] 
. . . that [plaintiff's] decline was caused at least partly by, 
if not substantially or mainly by, other factors than 
[defendant's] alleged antitrust violations." Amerinet, 972 
F.2d at 1495 (noting that the plaintiff's damage expert 
admitted that the plaintiff was in a period of decline prior 
to the defendant's alleged antitrust violations). In addition, 
the plaintiff in Amerinet was only able to show that, at 
most, the allegedly illegal activity was "one factor among 
many, and not a controlling or major factor" in specific 
potential clients' decisions not to purchase from the 
plaintiff. Id. at 1497. Therefore, the Eighth Circuit held that 
the plaintiff had not adduced sufficient evidence of element 
of causation to enable it to withstand summary judgment. 
 
Here, Rossi's evidence is more substantial than in either 
Van Dyk Research or Amerinet. Rossi has proffered evidence 
from five specific customers that they would have 
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purchased GAF product from Rossi if he had been able to 
sell it to them, and Rossi's inability to consummate those 
sales (leading to a loss of business and therefore injury) is 
a direct result of the alleged antitrust violation-- the group 
boycott. In addition, Richard Droesch, Rossi's partner in 
the failed Rossi Florence venture, backed out of that 
venture at least in part based upon his understanding that 
the company would not be able to get the products it 
needed, particularly GAF product, to compete successfully 
in the market. For all these reasons, we believe that the 
record supports Rossi's allegations that he suffered 
antitrust injury, and that it was caused by the defendant's 
allegedly unlawful actions. 
 
The district court also utterly rejected Rossi's damage 
expert, holding that his report was nothing more than a 
"but for" damage model that failed as a matter of law to 
support Rossi's damage allegations. We believe, however, 
that the Rockhill Report, when combined with the 
testimony concerning the five lost sales, is indicative of a 
larger pattern of loss and helps Rossi demonstrate 
causation. Thus, while the other damage evidence is 
enough alone to satisfy Rossi's summary judgment burden, 
for the guidance of the district court on remand, we 
nonetheless consider the Rockhill Report. 
 
A typical "but for" damage model, like the one in Southern 
Pacific Com. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F. Supp. 
825 (D.D.C. 1983), aggregates the defendant's alleged 
violations and creates a hypothetical calculation projecting 
the plaintiff's profits and losses "but for" the defendant's 
antitrust violations. In Van Dyk Research, for example, this 
estimate was based upon an internal "task force" report 
created by the plaintiff projecting its own future 
performance. See 478 F. Supp. at 1327. The plaintiff then 
compares this hypothetical figure with its actual 
performance to calculate its damages. Courts usually 
highlight two problems with models created using this 
methodology. 
 
First, they do not attempt to measure the particularized 
effects of any specific alleged illegal practices, but rather 
rely on an aggregation of injury from all factors. See 
Southern Pacific, 556 F. Supp. at 1092. Second, their 
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hypothetical "but for" calculations usually rely upon 
unrealistic ex ante assumptions about the business 
environment, such as assumptions of perfect knowledge of 
future demand, future prices, and future costs that tend to 
overstate the plaintiff's damage claim. See id. at 1092-93 
(pointing out many difficulties not caused by the 
defendants that negatively impacted plaintiff's profitability 
yet were not accounted for in the "but for" damage model). 
Thus, using a "but for" damage model arguably makes it 
impossible for the trier of fact to determine what, if any, 
injury derived from the defendant's antitrust violations as 
opposed to other factors, and courts sometimes reject such 
models as the basis of either causation or amount of injury. 
See Southern Pacific, 556 F. Supp. at 1090, 1098; Van Dyk 
Research, 478 F. Supp. at 1327. 
 
The Rockhill Report is in many respects a "but for" 
damage model because it does not deal with the 
particularized effects of specific injuries, but rather 
aggregates all of Rossi's damages into one figure. Relying on 
Van Dyk Research and Southern Pacific, defendants argue 
that all "but for" models should be precluded as a matter of 
law from serving as a basis for antitrust causation and 
damage calculation. We do not agree with the defendants' 
reading of these cases (and, at all events, are not bound by 
them), which we conclude only stand for the proposition 
that some, not all, "but for" models are too speculative and 
must be precluded as a matter of law. The Rockhill Report, 
as we shall see, is much less speculative and does not 
suffer from many of the flaws in the damage models 
discussed in Van Dyk Research and Southern Pacific, and 
thus it is not comparable with them. 
 
Rockhill made two major assumptions in calculating the 
damages Rossi suffered because of his inability to procure 
products. First, he estimated that Rossi Florence and/or 
Rossi Roofing would have achieved the same pattern of 
sales revenues (and revenue growth) beginning in 1989 and 
extending to 2008 that ABC's Morristown sales branch 
actually achieved from 1990-1993, operating out of the 
same location, with Rossi as branch manager. Rossi makes 
a strong argument that this estimate took into account the 
poor general business conditions that existed at the time, 
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as well as any other extrinsic factors not related to the 
defendants' alleged boycott, because Rockhill based his 
estimate upon actual sales figures Rossi was able to 
achieve competing against the same firms, selling the same 
products at the same location to the same customers under 
the actual business conditions that existed at the time.21 
The second major assumption in the Rockhill Report is that 
Rossi would have been able to manage Rossi Florence and 
Rossi Roofing in the manner that he had run Standard's 
Morristown branch from 1974-1987. Rockhill used 
Standard's Morristown branch financial statements to 
develop 14-year averages for cost of sales, payroll expenses, 
equipment expenses, and administrative expenses (as a 
percentage of total sales) and applied them to the sales 
estimate. This kind of estimate, while perhaps not one upon 
which we would base our own personal investment 
decisions, nevertheless is sufficient to establish causation 
(especially when considered in conjunction with thefive lost 
transactions).22 
 
(Text continued on page 68) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. Defendants also complain that it is inappropriate to use sales figures 
Rossi achieved working for ABC, a major national chain, to estimate the 
revenues that Rossi Florence or Rossi Roofing would have achieved 
without the boycott. This position has some force and is certainly an 
appropriate argument to advance before the trier of fact; however, it is 
not uncontroverted. There is ample evidence in the record that wholesale 
roofing and siding sales has a strong local accent, and that after price, 
service and reliability are the next most critical factors in customers' 
purchasing decisions. Rossi had a long track record in northern New 
Jersey, and several witnesses testified that they would patronize Rossi 
regardless of whom he worked for, as long as he carried the product they 
needed at a competitive price, because he provided the best service. 
Thus, it is not clearly evident that Rossi's salesfigures with ABC (or 
Standard) would necessarily be higher than with Rossi Roofing. 
22. For the guidance of the district court on remand, we note that the 
Rockhill Report satisfies the relaxed Bigelow standard of proof for 
estimating the amount of damages under which: 
 
       the jury [may] conclude as a matter of just and reasonable 
inference 
       from the proof of defendants' wrongful acts and their tendency to 
       injure plaintiffs' business, and from the evidence of the decline 
in 
       prices, profits and values, not shown to be attributable to other 
       causes, that defendants' wrongful acts had caused damage to the 
       plaintiffs. . . . [When] [ ] tortious acts . . . preclude[ ] 
ascertainment 
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       of the amount of damages more precisely, by comparison of profits, 
       prices and values as affected by the conspiracy, with what they 
       would have been in its absence under freely competitive conditions 
       . . . we [have] held that the jury could return a verdict for the 
       plaintiffs, even though damages could not be measured with the 
       exactness which would otherwise have been possible. 
 
       In such a case, even where the defendant by his own wrong has 
       prevented a more precise computation, the jury may not render a 
       verdict based on speculation or guesswork. But the jury may make 
       a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant 
       data, and render its verdict accordingly. In such circumstances 
       `juries are allowed to act on probable and inferential as well as 
       [upon] direct and positive proof.' Any other rule would enable the 
       wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at the expense of his victim. 
       It would be an inducement to make wrongdoing so effective and 
       complete in every case as to preclude any recovery, by rendering 
the 
       measure of damages uncertain. 
 
Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264 (internal citations omitted). 
 
In Bigelow, the Supreme Court upheld a jury's damage award based 
upon a comparison of the plaintiff's actual profits with the 
contemporaneous profits of a competing theater with access to first-run 
films, which were illegally denied to plaintiff theater by a group of 
conspiring film distributors. See J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler 
Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (1981) (explaining Bigelow). The Bigelow 
plaintiff had also adduced evidence comparing his actual profits during 
the conspiracy with his profits when he had been able to obtain first-run 
films. See id. This was enough to uphold the jury's verdict. Similarly, in 
Zenith Radio, the Supreme Court permitted the plaintiff, who had been 
the victim of an illegal campaign against importers attempting to bring 
new products into Canada, to estimate its damages by comparing its 
market share in the United States (where it competed freely) with its 
market share in Canada (where it was the target of unlawful 
distribution-disrupting tactics). See 395 U.S. at 116 n.11 & 124-25. 
Finally, we have held that "plaintiffs must be free to select their own 
damage theories as long as they are supported by a reasonable 
foundation." Danny Kresky, 716 F.2d at 213 (upholding a market share 
damage calculation approach in which the plaintiff argued that had it 
not been for the defendants' antitrust violations, it would have been able 
to achieve a percentage of the excluded market segment equal to the 
percentage of the market it enjoyed in the rest of the market generally). 
 
Compared with these cases, Rossi's damage estimation is far less 
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On the subject of the Rockhill Report, we add that the 
defendants' criticism that the report is flawed as a matter 
of law because it improperly mixes data using "a variety of 
sources including the historic operations of Standard; ABC 
actual data; input from Mr. Rossi; and judgment" is 
unavailing. Rockhill used actual data to support his 
estimates, and thus they are based upon a "reasonable 
foundation." See Danny Kresky, 716 F.2d at 213. We do not 
suggest that Standard's problems with the report are 
baseless, only that they constitute genuine issues of 
material fact and should also be argued before the trier of 
fact. 
 
Finally, the defendants attack the evidence supporting 
Rossi's assertion of damages on several other bases. 
Defendants submit that Rossi Florence and Rossi Roofing 
failed because: (1) they were start-up operations, (2) they 
were founded during one of the worst recessions ever to hit 
the New Jersey housing market, (3) Rossi, as a manager, 
failed to control his costs, and/or (4) Rossi worked on other 
ventures to the detriment and ultimate failure of both 
companies. One or more of these reasons, particularly the 
theory that it was the recession, not a conspiracy, which 
mortally wounded Rossi's business efforts, might explain 
Rossi's failure in the roofing and siding business in 
northern New Jersey, and could conceivably result in a 
verdict for the defendants at trial. They are, however, 
unavailing to the defendants at this stage of the case 
because they all involve factual disputes that need to be 
resolved by the trier of fact, not by this court on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
speculative. The sales revenues (at least for the first few years of the 
ten 
year estimate) were exactly those that Rossi actually achieved while 
working as ABC's branch manager at the same location. Thus, the jury 
here need not even speculate whether the comparison market (or 
location) is similar enough to serve as a basis for its damage estimate, 
as the jury had to in Bigelow and Zenith Radio. Similarly, both the sales 
and expenses are based on real world numbers, not pure conjecture by 
an optimistic new competitor. These numbers may or may not accurately 
represent what Rossi Florence or Rossi Roofing would have done had it 
stayed in business, but they are clearly not mere speculation or wishful 
thinking, as was the case in Van Dyk Research and Southern Pacific. 
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Standard also argues that Rossi failed to establish 
causation because an essential element in causation 
involves proving that there are no comparable substitutes 
for the desired product -- here, GAF product. See Elder- 
Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 459 
F.2d 138, 148 (6th Cir. 1972). This is another factual issue 
that Standard may argue to the jury. As we have explained 
above, we are satisfied that Rossi's own testimony and that 
of several of his witnesses are sufficient to establish that 
GAF product was, for practical purposes, unique and highly 
desired in this market. See supra S II.B.2.b(1). 
 
In sum, Rossi has established a prima facie case of 
antitrust injury with respect to Standard, Arzee, and GAF. 
He has adduced evidence of specific lost transactions 
showing causation or fact of injury, which is bolstered by 
an expert damage report that is not overly speculative as a 
matter of law. The combination of this evidence, while not 
conclusive, provides enough of a foundation that an 
eventual finder of fact would be justified in making a "just 
and reasonable inference" of the damages Rossi may have 
suffered as a result of the defendants' allegedly unlawful 
activities. 
 
IV. STATE LAW TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE 
       WITH CONTRACTUAL AND PROSPECTIVE 
       CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 
 
The district court dismissed Rossi's state law tortious 
interference claims against defendants with no discussion. 
It very well may be, as some of the defendants suggest, that 
the district court concluded when it dismissed Rossi's state 
law claims that Rossi had not shown any wrongful or 
intentional conduct designed to interfere with alleged 
contractual or prospective contractual relationships. If that 
is the case, then based upon our disposition here, the state 
law claims will likely have to be reinstated with respect to 
the Standard defendants, the Arzee defendants, and GAF 
since we have found that there is sufficient evidence of their 
participation in an unlawful conspiracy to boycott Rossi. 
However, the district court may have had some other 
reason for dismissing these claims of which neither we nor 
the parties before us is aware. Our jurisprudence requires 
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district courts in this circuit to accompany grants of 
summary judgment with an explanation sufficient to permit 
the parties and this court to understand the legal premise 
for the court's order. See Vadino v. A. Valey Eng'rs, 903 
F.2d 253, 257-60 (3d Cir. 1990). We will therefore reverse 
the district court's order dismissing the state tortious 
interference claims against all defendants and remand 
them to the district court for further consideration and 
explanation consistent with this opinion. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's judgment on the federal antitrust issues with 
respect to Servistar and Wood Fiber, but reverse on those 
issues with respect to the Standard defendants, the Arzee 
defendants, and GAF. We will also reverse the district 
court's judgment dismissing the state claims with respect 
to all defendants. The case will be remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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